U.S. Airstrikes, Strategic Shifts, and Ceasefire Rumors: ME Update

The U.S. Launches Its Response:

(1) Day 1 of U.S. strikes included 125 precision airstrikes on 85 locations exclusive to Syria and Iraq. Iranian soil was avoided in hopes of de-escalation. Importantly, Jordan participated. The assault on Tower 22 in Jordan left 3 American Service Members dead and over 40 injured on January 28th. The U.S. leads the way in weaponry, but involving regional parties lessens the political impression of “hostility”. This is a key de-escalation strategy against Iran and Iraqi condemnation.

(2) U.S. plans were described as multi-staged, so one cannot yet draw conclusions about the results. Many decision trees that will be considered as Iran and its proxies respond. There have been preliminary reports of U.S. forces shooting down a few Iranian-backed militant suicide drones in the region. (Read More)

Early Observations:

(1) A delayed U.S. response likely gave time to align coalition forces in the region. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Sunni-led, are natural partners for further missions. The Saudis could have a growing presence in fighting the Houthi; the Saudis are in ongoing conflict with the Houthi and Saudi strikes by themselves have shown little success over more than a decade. Regional war would almost certainly lead to the Hormuz Strait looking like a 2nd Red Sea event. It could threaten Saudi and Qatari revenue from energy exports. Both are happy maintaining the status quo. U.S. airbases in both nations would likely draw them into fighting a regional conflict too.

(2) The U.S. seems to have switched to a proactive de-escalation strategy after enacting a defensive strategy for months. Now, the approach to avoid regional war seems to be measures to ensure Iranian proxies don’t have the operational capability to conduct another mass casualty event against U.S. forces. A second U.S. mass casualty event is the most likely spark plug for regional war in the ME today. Degrading militant ammo depots and bases have compounding effects, freeing resources for increased surveillance on ongoing threat centers. Despite the huge technological gap, no weapons system runs at a 100% success rate. The U.S. has announced cyber operations in Iran, a likely attempt to destroy communications channels and/or disrupt supply lines producing weaponry. (Read More)

Strategic Shifts:

 (1) The U.S. and Iran are toeing the “do not cross line”. At this point, the nation needing to declare war will be the loser. Domestic political pressures remain high in both nations, favoring peace.  

(2) The U.S.-U.K. launched joint strikes against ~35 Houthi targets. U.S. Central Command reported 6 anti-ship ballistic missiles destroyed on launchers. The strikes support the early observations above. Increased Houthi operations seem like Iran’s best method of recourse. A direct strike on U.S. naval assets could lead to a declaration of war. However, the operations would be in Yemen, not Iran. The Houthi already perceive themselves at war with the U.S., making a strike a massive Iranian success. (Read More)

(3) The threat of regional war has brought Saudi Arabia back to the negotiating table with the U.S. and Israel. A U.S.-Saudi-Israeli treaty rumored to be days away was likely what greenlit Iran’s support for Hamas’ October 7th terror attack. The agreement offered U.S. defense guarantees against Iran in return for Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel. In late December, it was reported that 95% of Saudis wanted to cut all ties with Israel. The deal appeared dead. Iran raising the risk of regional war seems to have severely backfired. (Read More)

Why Might There Have Been a Falsely Reported Ceasefire Earlier this Week?

(1) Al Jazeera, run by the Qatari government, may have published the false ceasefire in hopes of pushing a ceasefire deal forward. It maximizes pressure from the party with the most leverage against Israel in negotiations, hostage families. Hamas’ most effective operation since the October 7th terror attack was at Al-Ahli on October 17th when Hamas’ failed missiles were falsely publicized as Israeli strikes on a Palestinian Hospital. The impact of the court of public opinion cannot be underestimated.

(2) The IDF reports 60% of Hamas destroyed. The IDF was already moving a massive number of unneeded soldiers for continued fighting in Palestine to the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah is/was always the bigger threat. Are the U.S. and Israel considering running overlapping campaigns in Syria-Iraq (U.S.) and Lebanon (Israel)? It would greatly reduce the risk of 3^rd party involvement against Israel.  (Read More)

Is a Ceasefire Close?

(1) 30 days for hostages would work for Israel in principle. However, we think there is a severe miscalculation of the perceived cost to Israel. The cost to Israel is no longer in Gaza, which can be handled from a military perspective with Hamas largely degraded. Sequential hostage releases, as seen earlier, likely remove Israel's optionality for an invasion of Hezbollah in Lebanon for 30 days. How long do U.S. strikes last? Israel values the optionality to strike while the U.S. continues its operations, which presumably have been discussed.

(2) $17.6bn of Israeli defense support, including provisions for increased U.S. spending in the region, was stripped from a U.S. Ukraine-Border-Israel package deal. The House will vote next week. This could be a coincidence or people with knowledge we don’t have making informed decisions. The global community at large wants a ceasefire. Israel may not have the same support 30 days from now and the U.S. is entering an election cycle. (Read More)